Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2008

Reply Brief for Petitioner, Engquist v. Oregon
Department of Agriculture, No. 07-474 (U.S. April
9, 2008)
Justin Florence
Georgetown University Law Center

Mathew Gerke
Georgetown University Law Center

Neal K. Katyal
Georgetown University Law Center

Docket No. 07-474
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/scb/52

This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/scb
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

No. 07-474

OFFICE OF THE CLF--.~K

SUPREME COURT, U.S.

3Jn the upreme ourt af the f Initel tate
ANUP ENGQUIST,

Petitioner,
V.
OREGON DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, JOSEPH (JEFF)
HYATT, JOHN SZCZEPANSKI,

Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
VIRGINIA A. SEITZ
JEFFREY T. GREEN
QUIN M. SORENSON
PANKAJ VENUGOPAL
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

NEAL KATYAL*

CRAIG A. CRISPIN
CRISPIN EMPLOYMENT
LAWYERS

DAVID H. REMES
JEFFREY C. Wu
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP

JUSTIN FLORENCE
MAVrHEW GERKE
STEPHEN I. VLADECK

600 New Jersey Ave., N.W.
Washington,
D.C. 20001
1501 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 662-9000

500 Plaza West
1201 Penn. Ave., N.W.
9600 SW Oak Street
Washington, D.C. 20004
Portland, OR 97223
Counsel for Petitioner
[Additional Counsel on Inside Cover]
April 9, 2008
* Counsel of Record

SARAH O’ROURKE SCHRUP
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
SUPREME COURT PRACTICUM
357 East Chicago Avenue
Chicago, IL 60611
(312) 503-0063

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ooo

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................

111

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER ......................

1

I. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
PROTECTS INDIVIDUALS FROM DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT BY STATE
EMPLOYERS ...............................................

2

A. The Constitutional Text Plainly Protects
All Persons, Including Public Employ2
ees .............................................................
B. This Court Has Already Held That the
Fourteenth Amendment Protects Individual Public Employees from Discriminatory Treatment By State
Employers .................................................
3
C. This Court Takes Public Employer Interests Into Account When Enforcing
Public Employees’ Constitutional Rights,
Instead of Eliminating Those Rights ...... 6
D. Respondents’ Policy Arguments Do Not
Distinguish this Case from Olech ............ 11
II. TRADITIONAL EQUAL PROTECTION
DOCTRINE APPROPRIATELY BALANCES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES AND THE
INTERESTS OF THEIR EMPLOYERS ...... 14
A. The Highly Deferential Rational-Basis
Test Protects Government Employment
Decisions from Invasive Judicial
Scrutiny .................................................... 15

(i)

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS--continued
Page
B. Engquist Prevailed Here Only Because
Respondents Disclaimed Any Performance Rationale for Their Discriminatory Treatment .................................... 17
C. Several Additional Factors Limit
Successful Class-of-One Claims and
Prevent Burdensome Litigation .............. 19
D.This Court Need Not Eliminate Equal
Protection Rights To Preserve At-Will
Employment ............................................. 26
CONCLUSION .....................................................

29

ADDENDUM
Excerpts from Proceedings in the Trial Court ....A-1
Excerpt from Respondent State of Oregon’s
Closing Argument ............................................. A-4
Excerpt from Jury Instructions ........................... A-5

.oo

111

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Page

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe~a, 515
U.S. 200 (1995) ..........................................
3
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) .......
7-8
Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) ..................... 23, 24
Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610
(1986) .........................................................
15
Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d
456 (6th Cir. 2000) .................................... 25
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
(1998) .........................................................
25
Burt v. New York, 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir.
12
1946) ..........................................................
Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) ...................
7
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) ... 24
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
13
(1997) .........................................................
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985) ................................... 15, 23
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998)... 26
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868
(1991) .........................................................
24
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) ....
7
George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405 (D.C. Cir.
2005) .......................: .................................. 20, 21
Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440
U.S. 194 (1979) .................................... 3, 4, 5, 26

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES--continued
Page
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)...
25
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S.
127 (1994) ..................................................
7-8
James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) ........
21
Jennings v. City of Stillwater, 383 F.3d
1199 (10th Cir. 2004) ................................ 11, 13
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) .......
8
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000) .........................................................
15
Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631 (7th Cir.
2005) .......................................................... 9, 10
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304 (1816) ....................................
3
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
4
(1976) .........................................................
McPhaul v. Madison County Bd., 226 F.3d
558 (7th Cir. 2000) .................................... 25
Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U.S.
9
291 (1995) ..................................................
Miller-E1 v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) ..... 20
New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440
3
U.S. 568 (1979) ..........................................
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) ..... 6, 7
24
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) .....
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) ...............
21
Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co.,
5
207 U.S. 20 (1907) .....................................
3
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) .................
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) .......... 16, 21
Rutan v. Repub. Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62
25
(1990) .........................................................
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
25
411 U.S. 1 (1973) .......................................

V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES--continued
Page
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) .......
9
5
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944) ........
United States v. Harris, 197 F.3d 870 (7th
8
Cir. 1999) ...................................................
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.
562 (2000) .................................................. passim
Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992)...9, 11
SCHOLARLY AUTHORITIES
Deborah Ballam, Employment At-Will: The
Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 Am.
Bus. L.J. 653 (2000) .................................. 28
William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries
8
(1769) .........................................................
Deborah Markowitz, The Demise of At-Will
Employment and the Public Employee
Conundrum, 27 Urb. Law. 305 (1995) ..... 28
HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (5th ed. 2003). 10
OTHER AUTHORITY
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766-67 (1866) ...........

3

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
Based solely on policy concerns, the Ninth Circuit
held that the Equal Protection Clause does not
protect public employees who are singled out for
adverse treatment by public employers without a
rational basis and only for vindictive or malicious
reasons. This Court granted the petition to resolve
this single issue.
Respondents effectively concede that the Ninth
Circuit’s policy concerns are unfounded:
¯

"Respondents admit that where [class-of-one]
claims have been recognized apparently the
sky has not fallen and at-will employment
has not come to an end." Resp. Br. 40 n.14.

¯

"[T]he plaintiff almost always is unsuccessful
in these cases." Id. at 27.

¯

’There may be millions of government
employees, but the number of successful
class-of-one equal protection claims brought
by public employees against their employers
is almost nil." Resp. Br. Opp’n 23.

¯

The absence of a flood of litigation in the nine
circuits that have recognized class-of-one
claims in public employment "may be due to
the fact that the vast majority of public
employees have recourse to remedies other
than bringing an equal protection claim in
federal court." Resp. Br. 30 n.10.

Respondents also acknowledge that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s text supports the right of any person,
including public employees, to bring class-of-one
claims. Id. at 14. Respondents argue, however, that
"the constitutional text [should not be] taken
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literally." Id. Further, in defending the Ninth
Circuit’s decision, Respondents distort the record and
raise legal and factual issues foreclosed by the jury’s
verdict.
There is only one Equal Protection Clause. The
Court has consistently interpreted it to apply in the
public employment context as in all others. Reversal
is warranted on this ground alone. Moreover,
Respondents admit that the lower courts have been
able to weed out meritless public employee class-ofone claims using existing rules. This Court therefore
need not decide whether animus or some other
additional requirement is needed to cabin public
employees’ class-of-one claims. Indeed, because the
jury found animus here, the adoption of such a
requirement would still require reversal of the
decision below.
I. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE PROTECTS INDIVIDUALS FROM DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT BY STATE
EMPLOYERS.
Respondents do not contend that Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per
curiam), should be overruled. Instead, they argue
that this Court should adopt a new per se rule,
excluding some public employees from the definition
of "persons" under the Fourteenth Amendment. This
proposed rule radically departs from the
Amendment’s text and history and this Court’s
precedents.
A.

The Constitutional Text Plainly Protects All Persons, Including Public
Employees.

"This Court has constantly reiterated that the
language of the Constitution where clear and
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unambiguous must be given its plain evident
meaning," Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8 n.7 (1957)
(plurality), and that "no restriction upon its plain and
obvious import ought to be admitted, unless the
inference be irresistible," Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 339 (1816).
The text of the Equal Protection Clause
unambiguously protects "any person." Its "basic
principle" is to "protect persons, not groups."
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe~a, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995). A public employee is no less a "person" than
the property owners in Olech, and, like them, the
public employee may assert a class-of-one claim.1
Respondents counter that the Framers’ reference to
’~[a]ny person’ did not literally mean any person." Br.
19. But the statements they quote concern the
,Apportionment Clause, not the Equal Protection
Clause. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766-67
(1866).
B. This Court Has Already Held That the
Fourteenth Amendment Protects Individual Public Employees from Discriminatory Treatment By State Employers.
This Court has repeatedly held that under the
Equal Protection Clause, a public employer’s
discriminatory treatment of its employees is subject
to rational basis review, even when no fundamental
right or suspect class is involved. E.g., New York City
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Harrah
1 Although Respondents complain that Petitioner ignores the
phrase "of the laws," Br. 17, this Court has made clear that the
phrase includes not only legislative but also administrative
actions. Pet. Br. 17-20.
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Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194 (1979) (per
curiam); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976). Respondents simply ignore this precedent,
while the United States unconvincingly seeks to
distinguish it.
Amicus United States claims that this precedent is
distinguishable because it involves circumstances in
which "the government categorically excludes a class
of workers," and thus the court reviewed an
employment classification "to determine whether the
objective, group-based distinction [was] rationally
related to a legitimate government interest." U.S. Br.
9. This distinction fails for a number of reasons.
First, the proposed distinction between a group and
a class-of-one is artificial. As Respondents observe,
’"Class of one’ is not to be taken literally. Olech itself
may have involved a class of five, rather than of one."
Br. 28. Engquist could, of course, have characterized
her claim as part of a group, a "class of two" with
Corristan. Pet. Br. 6. The number of affected
individuals has no bearing on whether they possess
an equal protection right. As Olech establishes, the
Fourteenth Amendment protects classes of one, two,
or five. And government actions can be even more
dangerous when aimed at a single individual. Amici
Br. of Richard Epstein & Rutherford Inst. ("Epstein
Br.") 8.
Second, the United States’ proposed theory glosses
over key facts. In Harrah, for instance, this Court
did not review an official regulatory or legislative
policy, but rather a school board’s vote to handle an
individual teacher’s case in a particular manne~..
Martin’s challenge was not to the official Board policy
to deny raises to teachers who did not comply, but
instead to the Board’s vote to treat her
noncompliance as grounds for not renewing her
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contract. This Court properly subjected "the Board’s
action" against Martin to rational-basis review. 440
U.S. at 199.
Third, as Harrah reveals, the United States’
proposed distinction makes little sense in practice. It
is rarely possible to know whether a state employer’s
discrimination is an official government policy or a
government official’s decision, as a matter of his
policy preferences, to target a particular class. A line
between an official policy targeted at some nonsuspect class (e.g., the class of employees with green
hair, or employees who blow the whistle on a
supervisor, or employees who are over 65 years old)
and an official’s decision to target some individual
characteristic or behavior (e.g., dying one’s hair
green, or blowing the whistle on a supervisor, or
being 66 years old) is unworkable.
Fourth, this Court long ago rejected the theory that
governments could evade the Fourteenth Amendment
if its discrimination was the result of an official’s
policy decision in some particular case rather than of
a formally adopted law or regulation. E.g., Snowden
v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944) (holding that "unequal
application" of an otherwise neutral law constitutes a
denial of equal protection if it intentionally targets "a
particular class or person" or if the state official has a
"discriminatory design to favor one individual or class
over another"); Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction
Co., 207 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1907). This Court’s
precedents are well-founded, for a classification that
derives from a formally adopted official policy is no
more pernicious than a classification targeted by a
single official, at a single individual.
In sum, Respondents and their amici propose
abandoning this Court’s settled and well-understood
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precedent--that discrimination in employment is
subject at least to rational-basis review--for an
alternative that has no basis in the Constitution,
conflicts with this Court’s precedents, and would be
tremendously difficult to implement (if not entirely
meaningless) in practice.
C. This Court Takes Public Employer
Interests Into Account When Enforcing Public Employees’ Constitutional Rights, Instead of
Eliminating Those Rights.
The United States erroneously asserts that this
Cou~t has "categorically foreclosed constitutional
claims that have the potential to disrupt the
workplace and impair the functioning of public
employers." Br. 8. On the contrary, this Court
carefully balances constitutional commands with
public employers’ interests on a case-by-case basis.
To be sure, this balancing may yield "more limited"
forms of constitutional protection "in the public
employment context," U.S. Br. 9, but this Court has
never imposed a categorical forfeiture of those rights.
See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717
(1987) ("[W]e reject the contention made by the
Solicitor General... that public employees can never
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
place of work.").2
2 The United States’ description (Br. 9) of O’Connor is
incomplete. There, this Court unmistakably held that public
employees possess Fourth Amendment rights and a reasonable
expectation of privacy. 480 U.S. at 717. Indeed, both the
plurality and the concurring Justice emphasized that
constitutional "protection against unreasonable searches by the
government does not disappear merely because the government
has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as
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None of the opinions cited by Respondents or the
United States (U.S. Br. 8-9, 15; Resp. Br. 34-37)
"categorically foreclos[ed]" public employees from
bringing constitutional claims. In Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), the denial of First
Amendment protection was focused entirely on the
fact that the speech in question was performed in
furtherance of official duties--i.e., job-related speech.
Id. at 422-25. This Court specifically declined to
decide whether the same would hold true for non-jobrelated speech.3 Here, in contrast, the jury found no
conceivable job- or performance-related rationale for
Respondents’ action. Garcetti’s holding was a result-not a repudiation--of this Court’s traditional
balancing. Id.
Similarly, in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986), this Court stated that "a prosecutor ordinarily
is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory
challenges for any reason at all, as long as that
reason is related to his view concerning the outcome of
the case to be tried." Id. at 89 (emphasis added and
internal quotation marks omitted). And in J.E.B.v.
employer." Id. at 717 (quoting id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment)). Similarly, although a government employer
has substantial discretion in employee management, the
Constitution forbids such an employer from acting in a "patently
arbitrary" manner. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961); Pet Br. 31.
3 This rule does not apply to all speech. As the United States
acknowledges, where an employee’s statements are not made in
her professional capacity, "the Court has balanced the
employee’s interests against the government’s interest in
effectively performing its functions." U.S. Br. 9 (citing Pickering
v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)). Garcetti itself eschewed a
per se rule, expressly reserving the question of "whether the
analysis.., would apply in the same manner to a case involving
speech related to scholarship or teaching." 547 U.S. at 425.
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Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), the Court
stated: "Our conclusion that litigants may not strike
potential jurors solely on the basis of gender.., does
[not] conflict with a State’s legitimate interest in
using such challenges in its effort to secure a fair and
impartial jury." Id. at 143 (emphasis added).
Far from holding that equal protection never
applies, the jury cases recognize that peremptory
challenges must be rationally related to the
governmental interest at hand. For example, Batson
and J.E.B. allow a prosecutor to remove a disabled
juror because she may become drowsy at trial. See
United States v. Harris, 197 F.3d 870, 876 (7th Cir.
1999). But they do not permit removal based on a
prosecutor’s "irrational animosity toward or fear of
disabled people." Id. "[W]here a classification is
subject only to ’rational basis’ review, the state may
use its peremptory challenges to strike jurors for any
reason rationally related to the selection of an
impartial jury." Id. at 874.
Just as a peremptory challenge must rationally
relate to the "outcome of the case," a public
employer’s decisions must rationally relate to some
legitimate government purpose. Indeed, what applies
to jury selection applies afortiori to employment,
given inherent constraints upon voir dire. See J.E.B.,
511 U.S. at 148 (O’Connor, J., concurring); William
Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *346 (describing
peremptory challenges as an "arbitrary and
capricious species of challenge").
Respondents’ reliance (Br. 37) on Kelley v. Johnson,
425 U.S. 238 (1976) is similarly unavailing. In that
case, this Court rejected a police officer’s due process
challenge to a grooming regulation only after finding
to legitimate
the regulation rationally related
government interests. Id. at 247-48.
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Respondents and their amici make no response to
Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992), in which
this Court unanimously allowed an equal protection
challenge to a prosecutor’s failure to seek a
downward departure. Indeed, equal-protection rights
of convicted felons are not limited to sentencing. See
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 n.ll (1995)
("Prisoners... retain other protection from arbitrary
state action even within the expected conditions of
confinement" and "may invoke
the Equal
Protection Clause"). Thus, on Respondents’ logic,
convicted felons have greater protections than public
employees, notwithstanding the greater judicial
burden of sentencing challenges
Only one appellate court--the Ninth Circuit--has
departed from this well-settled balancing approach
and categorically denied the protections of the Equal
Protection Clause to a single class of people. Nine
other courts of appeals followed this Court’s
consistent approach, carefully balancing government
and employee interests on a case-by-case basis. Pet.
Br. 22; Epstein Br. 13-16. No flood of litigation has
resulted. Pet. Br. 49-56. Enough time has passed to
put such concerns to rest. Cf. Metro. Stevedore Co. v.
Rambo, 515 U.S. 291, 300 (1995) (dismissing
litigation-flood concerns based on 11-year
experience).
Respondents seek support from Lauth v. McCollum,
424 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2005), but that decision did not
nullify public employees’ class-of-one claims. It
permitted them. Noting that it was "reluctant to
complicate the law by proposing different standards
for different categories of discriminatory state
action," it took the "more promising approach" of
ensuring that the standard of proof was appropriately
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protective of both government employers and
employees. Id. at 634.
Amicus United States contends that categorical
exclusion of public employee class-of-one claims is
essential because simply recognizing that such claims
may be asserted severely .impairs government
efficiency. Br. 16-17.4 This is hyperbole. To state a
claim, an employee must allege that the employer
singled her out for a reason not rationally related to a
legitimate employment-based interest, and ultimately
prove that the employer’s proffered rationales for its
actions are implausible and not rationally related to
any employment-based concern. The limited reach of
such a claim reveals why the government’s interest in
efficiency should not absolutely trump the equal
protection right; the whole point of allowing the claim
is to guard against irrational and discriminatory
employment actions by public employers. Valid as
efficiency concerns may be, it cannot be in the public
interest to act in such ways.
The United States further argues that the rarity of
successful class-of-one actions is reason to eliminate
them. But that rarity is a reason to allow such
actions, not prohibit them. This Court continues to
recognize Bivens actions, for example, even though
the success rate of such claims is vanishingly small.
See HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 821 (5th ed. 2003) (reporting
4 For federal employees, Bivens actions are foreclosed. Pet. Br.
52 n.18; U.S. Br. 22 n.5. Nor is equitable relief available, for
reasons advanced by the United States elsewhere. U.S. Opp.
Cert. 8-9, Dotson v. Griesa, 126 S. Ct. 2859 (2006) (No. 04-1276).
The United States also admits that sovereign immunity may bar
claims and that exhaustion would be required. U.S. Br. 22 n.5.
Tellingly, they fail to quantify the number of employees
(undoubtedly tiny) lacking administrative appeal rights.
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that in 15 years, "more than 12,000 Bivens actions
had been filed; that only thirty had resulted in
judgments for plaintiffs at the trial level.., that only
four judgments had actually been paid; and that
settlements are rare."). Similarly, Wade downwarddeparture challenges are almost never successful, yet
this Court recognizes them.
D. Respondents’ Policy Arguments Do
Not Distinguish this Case from Olech.
Respondents and their amici warn that allowing
class-of-one claims by public employees will subject
every decision by public employers to judicial
scrutiny. The local government made the same
argument in Olech. Pet. Br. at 7, Olech, 528 U.S. 562
(No. 98-1288).
As Respondents concede, this feared result has not
come to pass. Although judges have expressed
concern "about the transformation of every local or
state governmental decision into a constitutional
matter," Resp. Br. 25, their concerns have not been
limited to employment. In fact, none of the opinions
Respondents cite regarding this "transformation" is
an employment case. Id. (citing Justice Breyer’s
concurrence in Olech; a zoning case, Cordi-Allen v.
Conlon, 494 F.3d 245, 252 (1st Cir. 2007); and a lawenfo~’cement treatment case, Jennings v. City of
Stillwater, 383 F.3d 1199, 1210 (10th Cir. 2004)).
Respondents do not ask this Court to overrule
Olech, which is, in any event, deeply rooted in the
Constitution’s text and precedent.5 But the very
50lech refutes Respondents’ assertion (Br. 23-24) that its
holding did not flow from earlier decisions. The Court
acknowledged--without dissent--that "[o]ur cases have
recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a ’class
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cases they cite undermine their policy-based claim
that employment decisions, alone among all state
actions, should be immune from the Equal Protection
Clause.
Carving out employment is particularly inapt
because there is often no material difference between
the state’s control over an individual’s livelihood as
employer, on the one hand, and as regulator, on the
other. State actions affect employment in a host of
ways--through direct employment, contracting,
licensing, and regulation. Under Respondents’
theory, the following individuals have recourse while
the public employee does not: an architect who is
repeatedly singled out and denied licenses by a
Building Commission without rational basis; an
architect whose projects are singled out for
particularly strict regulation without rational basis;
and an architect with whom the government
contracts and then terminates without rational basis.
See Burt v. New York, 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946) (L.
Hand, J.) (considering, in light of Snowden, the
claims of an architect whose applications were denied
because of "personal hostility").
It makes little sense, and denies "equal protection,"
to allow such individuals, but not public employees,
to challenge irrational governmental treatment. To
be sure, the balancing test for an equal protection
claim may weigh more heavily in the government’s
favor in the employment context, where the employee
has day-to-day interaction with the government
actor, but that is no reason for the courts to extend
of one.’" 528 U.S. at 564 (citing Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal v.
County Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989); Sioux City Bridge Co. v.
Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923); Sunday Lake Iron Co. v.
Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350 (1918)). See also Pet. Br. 18-19 (citing
additional authority). [o]
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equal protection to one type of interaction and deny it
to another. Whether an individual is directly
employed by the State, or merely dependent on it for
his employment, provides no basis for unequal
treatment under the Constitution.
Finally, the opinions cited by Respondent
demonstrate that courts have successfully avoided
constitutionalizing everyday government action "with
regard to everything from zoning to licensing to
speeding to tax evaluation." Jennings, 383 F.3d at
1211. Governments make millions of zoning and
licensing decisions, many of which are fraught with
personality disputes of epic proportion. As discussed
in detail in Part II, infra, the courts of appeals have
carefully accounted for government interests by
following this Court’s equal protection doctrine, as
prescribed in Olech.6
In sum, Respondents and their amici raise the
same alarmist policy concerns that were submitted to
this Court in Olech. This Court rejected those
concerns then, they have not materialized in practice
in the interim, and they provide no basis for
distinguishing this case from Olech now. For these
reasons alone, this Court should reverse the opinion
of the Ninth Circuit.

~ Olech therefore adheres to this Court’s repeated admonition
that any difficulty in line-drawing is no justification for
extinguishing a right altogether. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997) (noting that, although it is difficult
to distinguish "the line" between statutes permissibly and
impermissibly enacted under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
"the distinction exists and must be observed").
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II. TRADITIONAL EQUAL PROTECTION
DOCTRINE APPROPRIATELY BALANCES
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES AND THE INTERESTS OF
THEIR EMPLOYERS.
Nine courts of appeals recognize class-of-one
claims brought by public employees. No litigation
flood has resulted. At-will employment continues to
exist in States in all nine of those circuits. This
Court’s traditional equal protection doctrine has
proved sufficient to prevent or quickly dispose of
meritless claims, avoiding the constitutionalization of
"everyday" government employment decisions.
The class-of-one claim serves an important but
limited function. It prevents the government from
discriminating against its employees without any
rational basis. The claim furthers good government
by precluding public authorities from intentionally
and irrationally depriving individuals of their
livelihoods, and by guaranteeing taxpayers that
renegade managers will not abuse valuable public
employees.7 Class-of-one plaintiffs will---and
should---succeed only in those rare cases in which the
government employer acts in ways that are not
conceivably related to the public interest, and that
can serve no plausible government purpose.

7 The federal experience shows that prohibiting arbitrary
employment decisions improves government functioning and job
performance. Amici Br. of Nat’l Educ. Ass’n et al. 16-18.
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A. The Highly Deferential Rational-Basis
Test Protects Government Employment Decisions from Invasive Judicial
Scrutiny.
Even if a public employer intentionally treats an
employee differently from others similarly situated,
the employee cannot prevail on a class-of-one claim
unless she establishes that the government lacks any
basis for its action that is rationally related to a
legitimate government interest. City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446-50 (1985).
This traditional rational-basis test is highly
deferential and avoids improper judicial intrusion
into government decisionmaking.8
Under the rational-basis test, a plaintiff may show
that the ’"facts on which the classification is
apparently based could not reasonably be conceived
to be true by the governmental decisionmaker."’
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000)
(citation omitted). Thus, the state action must be
8 There are reasons why the rational-basis test could apply
differently to administrative than to legislative action. As the
United States observes, the "any conceivable basis" concept has
roots in the notion that the remedy for bad legislation is with
the "people" via the ballot box. U.S. Br. 25 (quoting McCray v.
United States, 195 U.S. 27, 55 (1904)). That logic is irrelevant in
assessing administrative employment decisions. It is also
difficult, if not impossible, to divine the actual motivations of
hundreds of legislators, unlike individual employment actions.
In addition, this Court has rejected explicitly the "any
conceivable basis" test in the analogous context of
Administrative Procedures Act challenges. E.g., Bowen v. Am.
Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 626-27 (1986) (plurality). Because
Respondents failed to appeal the jury’s verdict that Petitioner’s
termination lacked any rational basis, this case is not an
appropriate vehicle to decide whether a different standard
should apply.
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"grounded in a sufficient factual context for [the
Court] to ascertain some relation between the
[challenged] classification and the purpose it served."
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-33 (1996).
As Petitioner detailed in her opening brief, the
rational-basis test is particularly difficult for
employee-plaintiffs to satisfy because of the wide
range of legitimate government purposes in the
employment context. Pet. Br. 47-49. Given the
individualized nature of the employment
relationship, the government has more latitude in its
employment-related decisions than in regulating at
arms-length. Whereas concerns about an individual’s
personality or working style would not be relevant in
land-use, they are unquestionably relevant in
employment. After all, what is "rational" in the
workplace is very different from what is "rational" in
the Statehouse.
Class-of-one plaintiffs can virtually never overcome
performance or work-environment rationales.9 In
fact, it is a rare case indeed when a plaintiff can
survive an employer’s motion for summary judgment
indicating a performance orwork-environment
rationale for unequal treatment.While the United
States contends otherwise (Br. 13), in the vast
majority of situations, there is
no need for trial
because a supervisor’s discontent with the employee’s
performance or the effect thereof on workplace
efficiency will be sufficient for the government to
satisfy the rational-basis test.

9 In only rare cases could a plaintiff negate these stated
reasons for the adverse action, even if untrue. An example
might be a situation in which a supervisor claims an employee
disrupts his work environment, but the employee works 1000
miles away and never interacts with anyone.
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In sum, the rational-basis test does not lead to
excessive judicial review of legitimate government
employment decisions. If the government plausibly
claims performance issues as the basis for its
discrimination, the inquiry ends there.
B. Engquist Prevailed Here Only Because
Respondents
Disclaimed
Any
Performance Rationale for Their
Discriminatory Treatment.
Respondents do not quarrel with the jury finding
that there was "no rational basis" for their
differential treatment of Engquist.1° The United
States’ invitation to this Court to second-guess the
jury’s finding, U.S. Br. 32, is too late.
Respondents explicitly disclaimed any workplace or
performance-based rationale for terminating
Enquist.11 Nonetheless, for Engquist to prevail, she
still had to convince the jury that there was "no
rational basis" for Respondents’ action, and to do so
in the teeth of a business-judgment instruction that
barred the jury from finding for her based on its
disagreement with Respondents’ stated reasons.
App. A-5 (’~/’ou should not find that a decision is
unlawful just because you may disagree with the
defendant’s stated reasons or because you believe the
decisions are harsh and unreasonable ....
"); 10B
Trial Tr. 110, 150-51.
10 The Ninth Circuit did not question the jury’s rational-basis
verdict either, Pet. App. 19.
11 Respondents successfully barred many of Engquist’s trial
witnesses on this ground. E.g., App. A-2 (quoting Respondents’
attorney discussing eleven witnesses "all of which are primarily
put on the witness list.., to talk to how well plaintiff did her
job, and it is not going to be the defendants’ position the plaintiff
did not do her job well.").
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At trial, Respondents had every opportunity to offer
any conceivable theory for differentiating Engquist
from other employees, even rationales that did not
actually motivate them. E.g., 8 Trial Tr. 3-4 (State
claiming they noticed only after termination that
Engquist purportedly misrepresented her
qualifications). But those defenses failed because the
jury found as a matter of fact that the proffered
rationales could not be rationally related to the
decision to fire Engquist instead of others similarly
situated. E.g., id. at 5-9 (showing how State misread
her job application).
The position of the United States and other amici
demonstrates how the rational-basis test works in
practice to account for "everyday" employment
decisions. Amici assert that the state budget crisis
provided ample rationale for Engquist’s termination.
U.S. Br. 7; Amici Br. of Pa. et al. ("Pa. Br.") 14. The
budget crisis was one of Respondents’ initial stories,
but they abandoned it because Engquist was paid
from customer fees, not the state budget. 3 Trial Tr.
47-48. Oregon’s budget cuts were no more relevant to
Engquist than cuts in California.12
12 4B Trial Tr. 36 (Deputy Director of the Department of
Agric.ulture stating that no cost-shifting arrangement was in
place so cutting her position could not save General Funds and
would not be rational). The budget-crisis rationale was tried
(unsuccessfully) in a parallel case by her co-worker, Corristan,
who was paid from the Oregon budget.
The trial revealed that the stated rationales for Corristan’s
and Engquist’s terminations contradicted one another. With
Corristan, Respondents asserted a need for General Fund
reductions, and with Engquist, they asserted a need due to ESC
shortfalls. 6B Trial Tr. 30. This high-wire act collapsed in both
cases when it was pointed out that they hired a new employee
out of ESC funds (instead of using those funds for Corristan)
and were contemplating yet another hire. Nor could
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In the end, the jury trial showed that Respondents’
decision to terminate Engquist instead of others
similarly situated could not possibly be explained by
any business judgment or conceivable rational basis.
J.A. 64.1~
Respondents could have argued at any point that
Engquist had to be dismissed because of performance
or workplace concerns. But they did not make such
arguments and instead disclaimed them. And for
good reason. Had they claimed that they were firing
Petitioner for a performance-related reason, they
would have been required to use the collective
bargaining agreement’s generous procedures for
termination for cause.
In sum, rational-basis review applies to
government employment actions. This test usually
places a nearly insurmountable burden on plaintiffs.
The government may permissibly discriminate
against an employee if it can point to a plausible
rational basis for its action. It is only when, as here,
the plaintiff has negated those rationales that a claim
may proceed.
C. Several Additional Factors Limit
Successful Class-of-One Claims and
Prevent Burdensome Litigation.
As explained, the rational-basis test is highly
deferential to state action. Moreover, a series of
additional requirements under traditional doctrine-(1) similarly-situated employees; (2) intentional
Respondents explain why they terminated Engquist, who was
the major source of ESC revenue. See infra pages 21-22.
la On a separate count, intentional interference with contract,
the jury found that Respondents acted "against the employer’s
best interest," or for their own benefit outside the scope of their
employment. 10B Trial Tr. 135-36.
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discrimination; (3) adverse employment actions; (4)
and high pleading standards further
limits
successful cases, particularly in employment.
First, the Parties agree that the similarly-situated
requirement is difficult for employees to satisfy.
Although Respondents do not detail their proposed
test, they identify two subtests in use today: (a) that
the comparator be "prima facie identical in all
respects," and (b) the comparator be "treated
differently in the same time period." Resp. Br. 43-44
(citations omitted). Petitioner agrees entirely with
the second standard, and with much of the first.
Contrary to the United States’ position (Br. 17), there
is no confusion in the law about this requirement.
With respect to the "prima facie identical" concept,
the test turns on similarity in respects relevant to the
state’s treatment of the employee-plaintiff, as the
cases make clear. Pet. Br. 37-38. It is of no
consequence that two employees have different hair
colors unless that trait is relevant to the employment
decision. The requirement is for similar, not
identical, individuals. See Miller-E1 v. Dretke, 545
U.S. 231, 247 n.6 (2005). The similarly situated
requirement ensures that discriminatory treatment-and not mere policy disagreement--is at issue.
Here, the trial court and jury found that Petitioner
fulfilled this requirement. The Ninth Circuit never
reached the question. For that reason, Respondents
do not even ask this Court to resolve it. Instead they
merely speculate that "[h]ad the Ninth Circuit
reached the issue, it would have found" for them.
Resp. Br. 45. That prophecy is not correct,
particularly since the similarly situated requirement
requires detailed examination and is a question of
fact. E.g., George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 414-15
(D.C. Cir. 2005). Since the Ninth Circuit has not
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considered the issue, and neither party asks this
Court to resolve it, the Court should not do so. And
the fact that this issue is still lingering is yet another
reason why this Court should decline Respondents’
invitation to adopt prematurely a series of further
’~heightened standards" at this juncture.
In any event, to correct the record, there was ample
evidence for the jury’s finding. Respondents proffered
one rationale for their termination of Engquist-declining wheat revenues. Engquist proved that she
was similarly situated to the other employees with
respect to that rationale.TM She identified 30
comparators. 6B Trial Tr. 58. The degree of
similarity was complete with respect to the proffered
justification--the employees were all potentially
subject to a layoff due to declining wheat revenues.15
The trial court agreed. Id. at 68.16
14 Budgetary rationales traditionally involve inquiry into
whether similarly-situated persons are singled out
impermissibly. E.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (finding goal of
"conserving resources to fight discrimination against other
groups" inadequate to preclude antidiscrimination protections
for homosexuals); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972)
(holding as unconstitutional a debt recoupment statute that
treated civil and criminal defendants differently because the
government could not explain why criminal defendants were
singled out for less favorable treatment); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 229 (1982) ("[E]ven if improvement in the quality of
education [due to increased funds] were a likely result of barring
some number of children from the schools of the State, the State
must support its selection of this group as the appropriate target
for exclusion.").
15 Respondents’ closing argument was devoted to the wheat
story. 10B Trial Tr. 65, 70-74, 99-100. It failed for many
reasons, including the fact that the shortfall was actually caused
by Respondents’ actions (2 Trial Tr. 64; 8 Trial Tr. 181-82, 185; 1
Trial Tr. 121), that new products would replace any potential
loss in wheat (3 Trial Tr., 105; 8 Trial Tr. 215-217), that budget
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cuts were unnecessary (3 Trial Tr. 25-26, 35; 8 Trial Tr. 218),
and that Szczepanski disavowed the restructuring rationale a
few months after terminating Engquist (7 Trial Tr. 147).
If anything, the differences among comparators cut in
Engquist’s favor. Respondents retained employees who brought
in no income or clients, while terminating Engquist, who
brought in the bulk of revenue and new clients--approximately
$200,000 from 40 different clients in 2001 alone. 2 Trial Tr. 30.
Szczepanski admitted that Engquist "was the main person to get
business." 5 Trial Tr. 180; see also 3 Trial Tr. 47-48 (testimony
that it was irrational to fire Engquist because she was in a
"business gathering position .... essential to the center."); id. at
68, 112-13; 10B Trial Tr. 29. Szczepanski also hired another
person, Hyatt, and reprogrammed the position to pay for it out
of wheat revenues. 3 Trial Tr. 22-23 (stating that filling position
cost ESC $40,000); 1 Trial Tr. 94-95; 6B Trial Tr. 30. And just
days after terminating Engquist, Respondents sought to hire
another new employee in wheat. 4B Trial Tr. 38-39. Hyatt
admitted at trial that he "made false statements about Anup
Engquist." SER 254. The evidence against Hyatt was so
.overwhelming that Respondents’ Counsel was forced to admit to
the jury in another legal proceeding that Hyatt "was a horse’s
ass." SER 57.
The only other layoffs occurred months after Engquist’s, and
were the result of other significant events, including
Respondents’ failed trip to Korea to meet wheat clients,
Engquist’s termination (which reduced ESC clients), and
Respondents’ mismanagement. These other layoffs are not
relevant under Respondents’ standard, which focuses on "the
same time period." Br. 44. And they weren’t comparable in any
event, as those termination notices attributed layoffs to
declining ESC revenue, unlike Engquist’s. E.g., 7 Trial Tr. 52,
145-46; 4B Trial Tr. 39; 10B Trial Tr. 41-42. That evidence fit
Engquist’s claim that the precipitous decline in ESC revenue
was caused by her termination (and not an explanation for it).
16 The trial court paid scrupulous attention to the similarly
situated requirement, even granting Respondents’ motion to
exclude evidence before trial on the class-of-one theory unless it
met the requirement. App. A-2.

23
Second, it is not enough for a plaintiff to establish
that she was treated differently from similarly
situated employees. She must also show that she was
singled out for that discriminatory treatment--that
the government intentionally targeted her. Some
courts require class-of-one plaintiffs to demonstrate
that they were targeted out of animus, vindictiveness,
or malice as part of this inquiry.
The Parties agree that animus is an important
factor in successful class-of-one cases. It is
Respondents and the United States that disagree.
Respondents view animus as a crucial additional
requirement; the United States wants to eliminate
the inquiry altogether. Petitioner takes a middle
ground: animus need not be required but is likely to
be relevant.
To begin, the United States erroneously describes
Petitioner’s position. U.S. Br. 26-30. Unlike the
dissent below, Petitioner has never claimed that
animus, by itself, is sufficient to state a class-of-one
violation; rather it is a potential piece of (not the
entire) puzzle. An individual may be treated
differently from others similarly situated if the
government has a rational basis for doing so, even
when animus is present.
At the same time, as Petitioner has explained,
there is no need for this Court to make animus an
independent factor. Pet. Br. 43.17 Instead, inquiries

17 Dissenting in Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), Justice Breyer argued
that "discrimination that rests solely upon ’negative attitudes,’
’fear,’ or ’irrational prejudice,"’ violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 381 (quoting Cleburne, 473 UoS. at 448, 450)
(citation omitted). In response, the majority recognized that
"presence alone" of irrational bias "does not a constitutional

24
into animus will almost always be a natural
byproduct of litigation because it is intertwined with
the intentionality requirement in employment
litigation. Given the panoply of other employment
protections, it is doubtful that eliminating class-ofone "animus" will preclude discovery and litigation on
this topic. Pet. Br. 51-53. This case amply proves the
point, as evidence of animus was discoverable for
Engquist’s Title VII claim, which survived summary
judgment. J.A. 35-36.
In any event, Respondents do not dispute
Engquist’s claim that she "alleged malice and the
jury can be said to have credited her evidence that
she was discriminated against because of
Respondents’ ill-will instead of
a legitimate
~s
government purpose." Pet. Br. 42.
Moreover, the fact that the jury instruction treated
animus as an additional requirement the jury had to
violation make" because Cleburne stated that such negative
attitudes must be ’"unsubstantiated by factors which are
properly cognizable.’" Id. at 367 (citation omitted). Taken
together, this discussion of Cleburne suggests that courts may
take note of evidence of improper motives so long as plaintiffs
negate the proffered rationales.
is At trial, Respondents blocked Engquist’s attempt to strike
"arbitrary" from the jury instruction--something she sought to
make a jury finding regarding animus absolutely clear. J.A. 6971. Respondents cannot profit from the ambiguity they created.
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 119 (1943); Freytag v.
Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 895 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
To the extent the instruction was unclear (something
Respondents do not claim), the noscitur a sociis canon remove~
the ambiguity. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 543
(1987). And the jury’s punitive damages award, based on the
instruction "that Defendants’ conduct was malicious or in
reckless disregard of plaintiffs right," 10B Trial Tr. 142, is
further evidence that the jury found malice.
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find lays to rest the United States’ concern (Br. 14)
that Engquist’s trial was improper. Animus did not
substitute for the rational-basis, similarly situated, or
intentionality requirements; it was a separate
required finding. J.A. 63-64. Thus, while this Court
need not decide whether animus is an independent
requirement for class-of-one claims, if animus were
required then reversal of the decision below would be
necessary.
Third, case law further accommodates government
needs by limiting actionable cases to materially
adverse employment actions, thereby excluding
minor complaints.19 E.g., McPhaul v. Madison
County Bd., 226 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 2000);
Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 462
(6th Cir. 2000) ("[D]e minimis employment actions
are not materially adverse and, thus, not
actionable."); see also Rutan v. Repub. Party of Ill.,
497 U.S. 62, 114 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
loss of one’s current livelihood is an appreciably
greater constraint than such other disappointments
as the failure to obtain a promotion or selection for an
uncongenial transfer.").2°
Fourth, the law ensures that judicial scrutiny does
not cripple government efficiency, not by withholding
constitutional protections from public employees, but

19 The de minimis doctrine also precludes inconsequential
constitutional claims. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
674 (1977); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 87 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
20 Claims may also be restricted to "tangible employment
action[s]," requiring "a significant change in employment status"
and not a "bruised ego" or a "reassignment to [a] more
inconvenient job." Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.So 742,
761 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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by establishing high standards of proof and carefully
employing procedural tools such as pleading and
discovery requirements. Pet. Br. 53-54; Crawford-El
v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 593 (1998) ("[V]arious
procedural mechanisms already enable trial judges to
weed out baseless claims that feature a subjective
element .... "); id. at 599 (suggesting "postpon[ing]
all inquiry regarding the official’s subjective motive
until discovery has been had on objective factual
questions"); id. at 601 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("[T]he authority to propose [further] far-reaching
solutions lies with the Legislative Branch, not with
US.").

As the experience of nine circuits shows, class-ofone claims do not generate additional lawsuits or
discovery. Plaintiffs already have other vehicles,
such as Title VII, to bring such claims. Pet. Br. 5152. Similarly, due process and equal protection
claims--whether based on race or gender or having
nothing to do with a suspect class--already obligate
employers to defend their decisions. E.g., Harrah,
440 U.S. at 199.
All of these factors, required under existing
doctrine, place heavy burdens on class-of-one
employees and prevent the constitutionalization of
"everyday" employment decisions.
D. This Court Need Not Eliminate Equal
Protection Rights To Preserve At-Will
Employment.
Petitioner’s opening brief explained why class-ofone claims will not eliminate at-will employment.
Pet. Br. 50 n.16. The United States nonetheless
argues that at-will employment can only be preserved
by terminating equal-protection rights of public
employees. U.S. Br. 17-20. At best, these concerns

27
might result in a different balancing of the relevant
interests in class-of-one cases involving at-will public
employees; they do not justify eliminating the cause
of action for all public employees.21
Nonetheless, Respondents themselves do not
embrace the United States’ claim: they acknowledge
that class-of-one claims have not undermined at-will
employment. Resp. Br. 40 n.14.2-~ This is because the
traditional rational-basis test combined with the
other demanding factors that plaintiff-employees
must overcome preserves at-will employment.
Indeed, Respondents’ amici show that at-will
employment is still recognized in the states within
the nine circuits that recognize class-of-one claims for
employees. Pa. Br. App. A.
As commonly understood, at-will employees may be
fired for "good reason, bad reason, or no reason at
all." In practice, whatever the actual reason for the
dismissal, a public employer can almost always
articulate some plausible rationale (even after-thefact) for terminating an at-will employee, be it
performance, personality, or effect on the office
environment. As the practice of nine circuits bears
out, employees can almost never negate these
purported rationales (unless, as here, the defendant
21 Because this case involves a contractual employee, there is
no need now to consider adopting any of the mechanisms that
would absolutely preclude at-will class-of-one claims, such as
animus or the de minimis doctrine. So, too, this Court need not
grapple with the question of whether an adverse employment
action for "no reason," is for an implicit reason, government
efficiency.
22 Amici Pennyslvania et al. appear to agree. Pa. Br. 7-8
("[M]any of these adverse effects could be minimized, if not
eliminated, by a proper understanding and rigorous application
of the correct principles").
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expressly disclaims performance-based justifications,
which it would have no reason to do for an at-will
employee).
Furthermore, this Court has long recognized that
the Equal Protection Clause trumps state statutory
and common-law employment regimes. Preserving
at-will employment could never be a sufficient basis
to preclude an individual from claiming she was
terminated out of racial or gender prejudice.
Protections against discrimination, retaliation,
dismissal in violation of public policy, and other "bad
reasons" have severely limited at-will employment in
the public sector (and any resulting concerns should
be addressed as part of the balancing process).
Implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing do
far more than class-of-one claims to further constrain
public at-will employment. "The single, most
important change in employment law over the past
decade has been the demise of at-will employment" as
"the result of court decisions" recognizing "an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing," Deborah
Markowitz, The Demise of At-Will Employment and
the Public Employee Conundrum, 27 Urb. Law. 305,
305-06 (1995) (footnotes omitted). This covenant has
been read to require employers to act "in good faith
by treating all like employees alike." Id. at 313
(footnote omitted). And the covenant imposes many
broad restrictions beyond similar treatment, so that
"employers soon will no longer be able to terminate
employees for no cause or bad cause." Deborah
Ballam, Employment At-Will: The Impending Death
of a Doctrine, 37 Am. Bus. L.J. 653, 686-87 (2000).
Recognizing class-of-one claims does not end public
at-will employment as either a practical or theoretical
matter.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Ninth Circuit should
be
reversed.
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ADDENDUM
Excerpts from Proceedings in the Trial Court
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
ANUP ENGQUIST,
Plaintiff,
No. CV-02-1637-AS

VS.

OREGON DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, JOHN SZCZEPANSKI,
and JOSEPH (JEFF) HYATT,
Defendants.
October 15, 2004
[Page 69]
COURT TO COUNSEL
On Number 8, the evidence regarding the class of one,
I’m going to grant the motion but permit the plaintiff to
provide evidence of others similarly situated to take it out of
the motion. I don’t know if that’s clear, but I’m going to
grant the motion in limine with respect to Number 8 unless
the plaintiff actually supplies evidence of others similarly
situated.
Do you understand that, Mr. Brischetto?
MR. BRISCHETTO: I don’t, but I’ll need to think it
through and maybe we can talk about it Monday.

A-2
THE COURT: Okay, good. What I’m saying is that
-- let me help you out a little bit on the summary judgment. It
may be if it’s sufficient to get a fast summary judgment
motion, but I still think there has to be evidence that similarly
situated persons, in order to have a viable class of one claim,
go to the jury.
MR. BRISCHETTO: Okay. I’m hearing that
differently. Typically, a motion in limine, I would say, would
exclude evidence. And you’re not talking about order of
proof, you’re talking about at the end of the case, there need
to be? I mean, because -THE COURT: Well, I think the motion -- I didn’t
mean to interrupt, but I think the motion is that if evidence of
discrimination based on class of one should be excluded
[Page 70]
unless there’s a basis for a showing that there is
similarly situated persons.
MR. COLLINS: That’s correct.
October 18, 2004
[Page 39]

MR. ABRAMS: Your Honor, there’s a series of
about 11 witnesses here fi-om 14 to 25, all of which are
primarily put on the witness list, as far as we can determine,
to talk to how well plaintiff did her job, and it is not going to
be the defendants’ position the plaintiff did not do her job
well.
So this really is putting her positive
[Page 40]
character into evidence before it’s been attacked. And
if we slip up and -- and, you know, we’ve had some
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discussion in discovery about whether she left early, whether
she did crossword puzzles, things like that. You know, I -- I
would argue there may be some role for this in rebuttal, but I
would argue all 11 of these witnesses should be excluded as
cumulative and character evidence and character not in
question.
THE COURT: Mr. Brischetto.
MR. BRISCHETTO: Well, they’re offered on several
bases. Number one, contrary to defendants’ assertions, they
are apparently going to put on evidence that Ms. Engquist
was denied promotion because of claimed performance
problems. And that evidence will be coming in in our casein-chief. My understanding is that because it comes in our
case-in-chief, that we have the opportunity to rebut it at that
time.
So it will be relevant to Szczepanski’s claim that she
had performance problems and she would be denied
promotion on that basis.
It would also be related to the termination claims and
whether or not the terminations were arbitrary, vindictive and
malicious. Even if we prove that the decision to lay her off
was inappropriate, a jury could conclude that they terminated
her improperly for
[Page 4 l ]
performance reasons.
So in order to show that there is no other reason, we
have to show that she was a good performer. It relates to the
intentional interference with contract claim because it shows
that she’s a good employee and why are they doing this to
her.
THE COURT: Well-MR. ABRAMS: Your Honor, I think a couple things.
Number one, termination, I think the evidence is going to be
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that we look at the position, the function of the position. At
no point is there any evidence that we laid off Ms. Engquist
because we didn’t think she was doing that position well.
As to the specifics that might have been taken into
account in terms of the promotion. Now, ifI know that
project X was not handled well, it is not a counter to that that
she did X, Y, and Z (a) fine and (b) fine. You can counter by
bringing in evidence specifically saying you’re wrong, she
did X well.
Trotting 11 witnesses up there to talk about generally
she performed still is character evidence, it doesn’t go to the
issues Mr. Brischetto raises.
THE COURT: Although I don’t buy your allusion, or
whatever it’s called, to X, Y, and Z, because you could do
that in certain instances.
[Page 42]
I’m going to preclude this on the plaintiff’s case-inchief. It can come in on rebuttal if in fact there’s a question
raised as to her performance in either in whole or in part.
November 17, 2004
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MR ABRAMS [TO JURY]: Ladies and gentlemen,
the Judge will tell you that in a case such as this, it isn’t up to
you to decide whether you agree with the business judgments
that were made by the agency. In this case, Mr. Hyatt and Mr.
Szczepanski, it isn’t a question of whether, as Mr. Brischetto
suggests, other agencies were able to get past these cuts
without cutting staff. It isn’t a question of whether you think
that is public policy, to cut staff.
The question is whether there was discrimination and
whether these actions were based upon vindictiveness and

A-5
discrimination without -- without, and I emphasize that -without any rational basis. Ladies and gentlemen, whether
you agreed with these decisions or not, they were made in the
best interests of the State of Oregon and the Department of
Agriculture.
[Page 136]

COURT [TO JURY]: You should not fend that a
decision is unlawful just because you may disagree with the
defendant’s stated

[Page 137]
reasons or because you believe the decisions are harsh and
unreasonable, as long as the defendant would have reached
the same decision, regardless of the plaintiffs race, color,
national origin, gender or classification.
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